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Breaches of lease ‘capable of remedy’: A technical or practical approach? 
 
Sharon Christensen1 and Bill Duncan2 
 
The service of a notice to remedy a breach of a lease covenant is the essential 
precursor to a lessor  enforcing a right of re-entry where the lease contains a re-entry 
clause. If the notice can be invalidated by the lessee, subsequent proceedings will be 
misconceived. A failure to specify in the notice how a breach may be remedied, 
where the breach is capable of remedy or where compensation may be sought in 
lieu, may cause the invalidation of the notice. There are significant differences of 
opinion between the English and Australian courts on this question. This article 
explores these differences in the light of a recent English Court of Appeal decision 
Akici  v LR Butlin Ltd  [2006] 1 WLR 201. This case strongly suggests that the more 
practical interpretation of the Australian courts of the expression "if the breach is 
capable of remedy"  is the correct  approach instead of the more technical and 
restrictive approach that has been previously accepted  in England. 
 
 
Context 
 
A significant amount of litigation is generated each year by lessees challenging the 
validity of notices to remedy breach served by landlords. If the notice is found by a 
court to be invalid, then all subsequent ejectment proceedings will be misconceived 
and, effectively, a lessor must re-serve the notice and, if the breach remains un-
remedied, issue fresh proceedings. It is, therefore, critical to ensure that any notice 
issued is not only factually, but technically, correct in all respects. The recent English 
Court of Appeal decision of Akici v LR Butlin Ltd3 highlights the difference in 
approaching the question from a technical or practical perspective.  The Court of 
Appeal examined the validity of a notice to remedy a breach of covenant where the 
lessee argued the notice was invalid for failing to specify actions necessary to 
remedy the breach. In deciding the lessee’s claim the court was required to consider 
the question of whether a parting of possession was a breach ‘capable of remedy’ by 
the lessee. The statutory provisions in most Australian jurisdictions, which require a 
notice to remedy prior to forfeiture of a lease are virtually identical to those in s 146 
(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (Eng)4 therefore, the decision provides an 
opportunity to compare the English and Australian approaches.   
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Overview of Statutory Requirements 
The origin of the requirement that a notice be served as a condition precedent to 
exercise of a right of re-entry for breach of a covenant in a lease is found in s14 of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881 (Eng). This section was subsequently re-enacted in s 
146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (Eng). The original purpose of the notice was 
explained by Lord Russell CJ in Horsey Estates Ltd v Steiger5 where His Lordship 
stated that the object of the section was to require a notice to precede any action to 
enforce a forfeiture of a lease. The notice should give the lessee precise information 
of what is alleged by the lessor, what is demanded from the lessee and that a 
reasonable time shall, after notice, be allowed for the lessee to act before an action is 
brought. The purpose of this, His Lordship suggested, was that the lessee ought to 
have the opportunity of considering whether or not the lessee will admit the breach 
alleged, whether it is capable of remedy, whether the lessee ought to offer 
compensation and, finally, to permit the lessee a right to relief against forfeiture in 
appropriate cases. In short, His Lordship said, that the notice was intended to give 
the person whose interest it is sought to forfeit, the opportunity of considering their 
position before an ejectment action is brought.6 
 
The operative words of each iteration of the original section (including the relevant 
provision in each Australian state), as far as material, are as follows: 
 
A right of re-entry or forfeiture under any provision in a lease for any breach of covenant 
shall not be enforceable by action or otherwise unless and until the lessor serves on the 
lessee a notice –  
 
a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and 
b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the 
breach; and  
c) in the case the lessor claims compensation in money for the breach, 
requiring the lessee to pay the same. 
 
And the lessee fails within a reasonable time after the service of the notice to remedy 
the breach, if it is capable of remedy, and, where compensation in money is required, to 
pay reasonable compensation to the satisfaction of the lessor for the breach” 
 
Clearly, the words of the section itself contemplate that some breaches may not be 
capable of remedy, but give no guidance as to what the expression “capable of 
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remedy” may mean in this sense7. This is the crux of the problem. It is clear from 
relevant decisions, to be examined shortly in relation to the different types of 
breaches, and from the various forms of notice prescribed by statute 8 that the 
following information should be given in a notice as a minimum. 
 
1. a full description of the covenant (or covenants) of which it is alleged the 
lessee has breached;  
2. what might be done to remedy those breaches; 
3. if compensation is claimed, the particulars for what is being claimed. 
 
When considering the adequacy of notices the courts have found no difficulty in 
setting aside notices where a lessee may have entertained a reasonable doubt as to 
the exact nature of the breach, what was required to remedy the breach and whether 
or not compensation was payable9. The lessor must, therefore, make some 
judgement, based upon sometimes conflicting cases, as to what should be contained 
in the notice, notwithstanding, in the lessor’s opinion, the breach may not be capable 
of remedy. Before considering specific instances of breaches and the views taken by 
the courts, it is appropriate to mention the importance of adherence to forms of 
notice, where these are prescribed. 
 
Prescription of Forms 
 
Forms of notice are prescribed in New South Wales, Queensland and Northern 
Territory10. In each of these jurisdictions, the prescription is different. The Sixth 
Schedule to the Conveyancing Act 1919 in New South Wales requires the notice to 
be in the form of that Schedule “or to a similar effect”.  As became obvious from the 
judgment of Johnson v Senes and Burger,11 the lessors failed to convince the court 
that information contained in exchange of correspondence could supplant the detail 
in the notice required by the Sixth Schedule. In particular, the form of the notice in 
that Schedule was found to be structured in a certain way and to contain a “Note” 
which read; 
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“Note: the lessor will be entitled re-enter or forfeit the lease in the event of the 
lessee failing to comply with the notice within a reasonable time. See Section 129 
of the Conveyancing Act 1919” 
 
Wallace J indicated, that, in his opinion, the “Note” formed a vital part of the notice, 
and, as it was missing from the informal correspondence, that fact alone rendered 
the notice nugatory.12 Lessors have suffered the same fate in Queensland where an 
“approved” form is also prescribed and where parts of the form have been omitted, 
particularly a similar note explaining the purpose of the form to the lessee13. In those 
prescriptive jurisdictions, it is of particular importance to have close regard to the 
prescribed forms as the courts have similarly done when the validity of notices in 
those jurisdictions have been called in to question by lessees. Other jurisdictions, 
including England, do not appear to prescribe forms as notices, but do prescribe the 
information which should appear in the notice. 
 
Distinguishing remediable from irremediable breaches 
 
It should be said that, at the outset, there is little argument that most common 
breaches are capable of remedy. For example, a failure to pay rent and outgoings is 
remediable by payment which can completely expunge the breach. A failure to repair 
is remediable by undertaking the repairs to the condition required in the lease. In 
such a case, a lessor is restored to their original position before the breach as if the 
breach had never occurred. Breach of use covenants, are also remediable by 
stopping the wrongful use, with or without payment of compensation14. On the other 
hand, some breaches are obviously incapable of remedy. For example, it has been 
held that bankruptcy is a breach incapable of remedy.15 A breach of a positive 
covenant to maintain insurance against loss by fire might also be incapable of 
remedy after the time when the premises have already been burnt down,16 but 
remediable prior to the loss occurring by payment of a premium. 
 
                                                 
12  Ibid 567; see also in respect of New South Wales,  Dugan v Morton (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 142 
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15  Civil Service Cooperative Society Ltd v McGrigor’s Trustee [1923] 2 Ch 347. Compare with a 
contractual right to terminate a lease for insolvency, where no notice at all may be required 
because there is no breach of covenant: Melacare International Ltd (In Receivership) v Daley 
Investments Pty Ltd (1999) BPR 17,095. 
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Another instance of a breach which may be incapable of remedy is where the lessee 
is convicted of an offence which may be a breach of the lease. For example, in 
Rakay v MacFarlane17 a lease contained covenants that the lessees would comply 
with and not commit any breach of provisions of any statutes or regulations and that 
the lessees would, at all times give notice to the lessor within 24 hours of any 
convictions against them as a consequence of the use of the premises under any 
statutes or regulations. The leased premises operated as a restaurant. Following a 
police raid upon the premises, one of the lessees was arrested and convicted for 
illegally selling liquor on the premises. The lessor gave notice to remedy breach 
under the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 129 the breach specified in the notice 
being the conviction of a waiter for illegally selling liquor on the premises and the 
failure of the lessee to give notice of any convictions within 24 hours. The notice did 
not require the lessee to remedy the breaches for the obvious reason that they were 
irremediable. Regardless of this, the court found that the notice to remedy breach 
was required. The act of the waiter was imputed to the employer lessee. Counsel for 
the lessee sought to strike out the notice on the basis that the breach was capable of 
remedy, and the notice did not require the lessee to remedy the breach. The 
particular breach which was capable of remedy was the failure of the lessee to give 
the lessor notice at all of the fact of the conviction. It was argued that this was 
capable of being remedied by giving notice at a later date. McClemens J resolved 
this contention by saying that even if the lessee’s claims were correct, and the failure 
to give notice of the conviction within 24 hours was capable of being remedied, the 
conviction was not capable of being remedied and it remained a breach of the 
lease18. The notice which omitted how the breach should have been remedied was 
still held to be valid. 
 
These are relatively simple cases to understand. More difficult problems of principles 
have arisen from other forms of breach where the classification of breaches as 
continuing or “once and for all” or positive or negative, have clouded the rationales 
given previously by courts for whether a breach is capable of remedy. In particular 
the question of whether the breach of a covenant prohibiting assignment without 
consent of the lessor can be remedied has been dealt with differently in the UK and 
Australia.  
 
                                                 
17  [1961] NSWR 1121.  
18  Ibid 1125-1126. 
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Is assignment of a lease without consent an irremediable breach? 
 
i. The English Cases 
 
The answer to this question has proved most contentious over the years and led to 
diametrically opposed views being accepted for a time in Australia and in England. 
One view is clearly represented by the English Court of Appeal decision of Scala 
House and District Property Co Ltd v Forbes19 where lessees covenanted not to 
assign or sublet without the lessor’s consent. The lease was assigned with consent 
to another party who, without the written permission of the lessor, created a further 
sub-tenancy to manage a restaurant on the premises. The creation of a sub-tenancy 
was clearly a breach of the lease. The lessor issued a notice to remedy giving the 
lessee 14 days in which to make good the breach, failing which the lessor issued 
proceedings for repossession of the premises. The question on appeal was whether 
or not 14 days was sufficient time to elapse between service of the notice and the 
issue of the writ in the circumstances. The resolution of this matter went directly to 
the validity of the notice. The answer to this rested upon the question whether or not 
the breach of the covenant not to assign or underlet without consent was a breach 
capable of remedy.   
 
Russell LJ (with whom James LJ and Plowman J agreed), considered that an 
unlawful sub-letting was a “once and for all” breach, in other words, once the sub-
lease had been created, it could not be uncreated.20 Sub-letting without consent, was 
therefore, in his Honour’s view a classic example of a “once and for all breach” and 
the only decision on that point which suggested otherwise, Capital &  Counties 
Property Co Ltd v Mills21 was wrongly decided. In the latter case, the Court’s view 
that unlawful assignment or sub-letting may be capable of remedy rested on the 
suggestion the lessor could waive the breach by consenting to the unlawful 
assignment or sub-letting after the fact. Alternatively, a breach by unlawful sub-
letting could be remedied by the lessee when the sub-lease expired by effluxion of 
time. In Russell LJ’s view neither of the these possibilities rested comfortably with 
the concept of having to give notice to remedy a breach within a reasonable time as 
a condition precedent to a lessor taking action to re-enter and forfeit based upon that 
breach. In holding the notice of 14 days good, Russell LJ made the following 
                                                 
19  [1974] QB 575. 
20  Ibid at 585. 
21  [1966] Estates Gazette Digest 96. 
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observations in relation to breaches such as unlawful sub-letting, which His Lordship 
held were not capable of remedy at all.  He said: 
 
“In my judgment, the introduction of such breaches into the relevant 
section for the first time by S 146 of the Act of 1925 operates only to 
confirm a statutory ability to relieve the lessee from forfeiture on that 
ground. The sub-term has been effectively created subject only to the 
risks of forfeiture: It is a complete breach once and for all; it is not in 
any sense a continuing breach”22. 
 
The crux of his Lordship’s view that the lessor did not have to call upon the lessee to 
remedy the breach was therefore that the breach, being a once and for all breach of 
a negative covenant, was not capable of remedy. This allowed the lessor to issue the 
writ for possession after the lapse of 14 days. This decision was examined in 
somewhat different circumstances in the English Court of Appeal in Expert Clothing 
Service & Sales Ltd v Hillgate House Ltd, 23 where again, a notice to remedy breach 
under s 146 of Law of Property Act 1925 was challenged by a lessee upon the basis 
it did not require the lessee to remedy the breaches of covenant alleged, upon the 
presumption that the breaches were irremediable. The facts in this case differed 
somewhat from those in Scala House & District Property Co Ltd v Forbes24. In Expert 
Clothing Services & Sales Ltd v Hillgate House,25 the lessors granted a lessee a 
lease of premises for 25 years from September 1977 under an agreement whereby 
the lessee would convert the premises into a gymnasium and health club. So far as 
material, the lease granted to the lessee permission to demolish and reconstruct the 
interior and roof of the demised premises, provided that the lessee commenced the 
work of demolition and reconstruction within 3 years of the commencement date, that 
is, by September 1980. There was no positive obligation on the lessee to 
reconstruct, merely a license to do so subject to certain conditions. After some work 
was undertaken on the premises, it became apparent to the lessee (and the 
guarantor) that premises were not going to be large enough for a health club and 
there was an attempt to assign them. By June 1979, rent remained unpaid, and in 
August 1979, the lessors re-entered the premises. This provoked the lessee to bring 
proceedings for repossession of the premises and relief against forfeiture. The action 
was compromised and a consent order imposed upon the parties. Under this order, 
the lessee had the right to elect whether to reconstruct the premises as office 
                                                 
22  Ibid at 588. 
23  [1986] Ch 340. 
24  [1974] QB 575. 
25  [1986] Ch 340. 
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premises or a gymnasium and health club but had to notify the lessor of its election 
before September 1982, being further  obliged to substantially complete works and 
make the premises ready for occupation as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. 
This gave the lessees about 15 months to effect works of reconstruction. By 
September 1982, no work of conversion had begun subject to the terms of this 
compromise, and the premises were very much in the same condition as they were 
at the time of the hearing in October 1979. The lessor then served a notice on the 
lessee pursuant to S 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 which asserted that the 
covenants in the lease, as varied by the compromised order, had been broken. The 
particular breaches complained of were that the lessee had failed to reconstruct the 
demised premises in any form, that the reconstruction had not been substantially 
completed before September 1982, and other covenants (not relevant here) had not 
been complied with. 
 
The breaches of covenant by the lessee were admitted at the Bar table. However, 
the question which fell to be considered by the Court was whether those breaches 
were “capable of remedy” within the meaning of the legislation. This was a question 
of crucial importance, as the Court said, for if they were capable of remedy, the S 
146 notice, which asserted that they were irremediable, would have been invalid and 
the proceedings for ejectment totally misconceived.26 Slade LJ, when confronted with 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Scala House & District Property Co Ltd v 
Forbes 27 sought to distinguish that case by stating that Russell LJ was addressing 
his mind solely to the “once and for all” breach of a negative covenant. Slade LJ 
found no corresponding anomaly arose if the “once and for all” breach of a positive 
covenant was treated as capable of remedy. His Lordship said that Scala House & 
District Property Co Ltd v Forbes28 could not be treated as authority for the 
proposition that a once and for all breach of a positive covenant was never capable 
of remedy.29 In reaching this conclusion, Slade LJ accepted that the concept of 
“capable of remedy” for the purpose of [the section] must surely be directed to the 
question whether the harm that has been done to the lessor by the relevant breach 
is, for practicable purposes, capable of being retrieved. His Lordship said that, in the 
ordinary case, the breach of a promise to do something by a certain time, could for 
                                                 
26  Ibid at 350 per Slade LJ. 
27  [1974] QB 575. 
28  Ibid particularly at 588. 
29  Expert Clothing Service & Sales Ltd v Hillgate House Ltd [1986] Ch 340 at 354. 
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practical purposes, be remedied by the thing being done, even out of time.30 The 
next issue for the court, having accepted that the failure to construct the gymnasium 
or offices within the time agreed was a breach capable of remedy, concerned the 
requirement that the lessor request the lessee to remedy the breach “within a 
reasonable time”. In such a case, what would be a reasonable time? One of the 
arguments for the lessor was that, even assuming that a breach of a positive 
covenant such as this was capable of remedy, if it was not capable of remedy within 
a reasonable time, effectively it was not capable of remedy at all. This point was 
rejected by Slade LJ31 on a point of interpretation of the section. Slade LJ opined 
that, when considering whether or not a remedy within a reasonable time was 
possible, a critical distinction had to be drawn between breaches of negative user 
covenants and breaches of positive covenants. In holding this breach of the 
covenant to reconstruct was capable of remedy, Slade LJ considered that the office 
or gymnasium might still be constructed and that the lessor could be compensated 
for the delay by the payment of appropriate monetary compensation, a factor which 
the section and notice both contemplated. The notice was, thus, held to be invalid for 
failing to require the lessee to remedy the breaches. 
 
Both of these decisions were reviewed in slightly different circumstances in Akici v 
LR Butlin Ltd32. Here, the breach of lease alleged was not to assign, underlet or part 
with possession of any part of the demise premises. There was some factual dispute 
mentioned in the judgment as to whether or not this had occurred. The lessors, 
considering that there had been a breach, served a notice on the lessee pursuant to 
s 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 which alleged a parting with possession of the 
premises without the lessor’s consent, giving the lessee 14 days after the service of 
the notice to remedy the breach. One of the issues raised by the lessee was whether 
or not the notice was valid, which, in turn, depended upon an answer to the 
proposition whether the breach was capable of remedy.  
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Neuberger LJ (with whom 
Mummery LJ agreed). The Court came to the conclusion that there had not been an 
unlawful assignment or underletting, but that the lessee had, in contravention of the 
lease, shared possession of the premises with another person. The difficulty for the 
lessor was that the lease quite clearly distinguished between parting with possession 
                                                 
30  Ibid at 355. 
31  Ibid at 356-357. 
32  [2006] 1 WLR 201. 
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and sharing possession. The relevant breach of covenant alleged in the notice was 
parting with possession with no mention being made of sharing possession33. A more 
difficult point was whether or not the breach of covenant against sharing possession 
was capable of remedy and, in considering this, Neuberger LJ was squarely 
confronted with Scala House & District Property Co Ltd v Forbes34 which, if not 
distinguishable, His Lordship was bound to follow. Neuberger LJ indicated that, 
considering the matter free from authority, he was firmly of the view the covenant 
against sharing of possession and, indeed, even a covenant against parting with 
possession, should be capable of remedy35. His Lordship considered that the proper 
approach to the question of whether or not a breach is capable of remedy should be 
‘practical rather than technical’.36 If a highly technical approach were adopted many 
breaches, such as a failure to paint the premises in the 5th year of the term or to use 
the premises for a particular purpose, because any performance of the particular 
covenant could not occur in the way originally contemplated by the covenant. In 
principle however, his Lordship said that he considered that a great majority of 
breaches of covenant were capable of remedy as contemplated by the legislation as 
the right to require a breach to be remedied also permitted the lessor, in the same 
notice, to claim compensation in money for the breach, whether it was remedied or 
not. 37 
 
Neuberger LJ considered that in light of the Court of Appeal authorities to date there 
were only two types of breach of covenant that were, as a matter of principle, 
incapable of remedy. The first was a covenant against assignment of or sub-letting,38 
and the second, a breach involving illegal or immoral use.39 His Lordship did not 
consider that classifying covenants as positive or negative or breaches as continuing 
or “once and for all” was of any assistance in determining whether or not a breach 
was remediable or irremediable.40  
 
                                                 
33  Ibid [52]. 
34  [1974] QB 575. 
35  [2006] 1 WLR 201, [63]. 
36  Ibid at [64]. 
37  Ibid [65]. 
38  His Lordship cast some doubt however as to whether, absent the decision in Scala House & 
District Property Co Ltd v Forbes [1974] QB 575 his  Lordship would have considered it a 
breach incapable of remedy. 
39  See below. 
40  [2006] 1 WLR 201 at [70]; Neuberger LJ also gained support for this view from the Court of 
Appeal in  Savva v Hussein (1997) 73 P & CR 150 at 156 per Aldous LJ who again held that a 
breach of covenant carrying out alterations without consent was remediable by restoring the 
property to its original position and paying appropriate compensation to the lessor. 
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ii. The Australian cases 
 
It is interesting to note that the position in Australia was represented by the carefully 
reasoned 1948 judgment of Sugerman J in Batson v de Carvalho41. In this case, the 
lessor alleged that the lessee had, in breach of the lease, parted with possession of 
the premises, suggesting to the unlawful occupants that they should conceal from 
and misrepresent to the lessor the terms of their possession. The lessor served a 
notice under S 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) citing the breach of 
covenant, but stating that the breach was incapable of remedy. After re-entry into 
possession, the lessee sought relief against forfeiture on the basis the notice to 
remedy breach was defective, in particular, because the breach was capable of 
remedy, and the notice did not require the lessee to remedy it. Sugerman J intimated 
that the mode of remedying a breach of covenant against assigning where the 
breach consisted, as in this case, in sub-letting or parting with possession, may be to 
procure a surrender of the sub-lease or a re-delivery of possession where it is 
possible.42 However, his Honour did not consider that this was the only mode of 
redress. The important issue was that, as at the date of giving notice, the lessee 
should be availed of an opportunity to remedy the breach whether or not that 
depends upon securing the concurrence of other person. His Honour said; 
 
“But I think it may be nonetheless, looking at the matter as at the date of 
the notice, that the breach is “capable of remedy” within the meaning of 
the section. Hence, it seems to me that a breach consisting and parting 
with possession or sub-letting without consent of the lessor, may, in 
some, if not in all , cases, be capable of remedy by applying for and 
securing that consent”43 
 
Sugerman J may have been influenced in this view by the fact that the lessor 
eventually accepted the “unlawful assignees” as lessees. This was in contemplation 
when the notice was given. Whilst this issue had not been directly litigated again in 
Australia, Wallace J in Johnson v Senes and Berger44, in dictum, indicated that “it is 
possible that the breach by sub-letting was also capable of being remedied’ referring 
to the “careful analysis” of Sugerman J.45 
 
In dictum, Sugerman J also relevantly opined that where the breach of covenant was 
not remediable so that there is no opportunity of giving the particulars in the 
                                                 
41  (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 417. 
42  Ibid at 426. 
43  Ibid at 427. 
44  [1961] NSWR 566. 
45  Ibid at 568. 
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requirement to remedy, then the notice should state the particulars in some other 
way. He said that the form prescribed provided a mode, but not the only mode, of 
specifying the particular breach and did not dispense with the necessity of doing so 
merely because the framework of the form was inappropriate for irremediable 
breaches.46 
 
It is submitted, in respect of a breach of covenant against assigning, sub-letting or 
parting with possession without consent of the lessor, the better view appears to be 
that it should be treated as a breach capable of remedy and a reasonable time given 
for the lessee to remedy that breach. Whether or not that is possible within the time 
given, is another issue and may go to the question of whether or not relief against 
forfeiture may or may not be given. However, the lessee should still be given the 
opportunity of seeking the lessor’s consent after the fact which, to paraphrase the 
words, of Neuberger LJ in Akici v LR Butlin,47 may constitute a triumph of practicality 
over technicality which is a desirable feature in pursuit of a solution to what is 
ultimately as much a commercial problem as a legal one. 
 
A breach of covenant involving illegal or immoral use 
 
In Akici v LR Butlin Ltd48 Neuberger LJ, in dictum, intimated that the other type of 
breach of covenant which may be incapable of remedy is a breach involving illegal or 
immoral use. His Lordship may have been prompted to make this statement in 
deference to the principles espoused in another long standing English Court of 
Appeal decision, Rubgy School (Governors) v Tannahill49 which has been followed in 
a number of subsequent English cases. In this case, a lessee committed a breach of 
her lease not to use premises for illegal or immoral purposes. The notice served 
upon her did not require her to remedy the breach or make any compensation in 
money. The lessee, in defending ejectment proceedings, challenged the validity of 
the notice upon this ground. The Court found that the breach was not capable of 
remedy and that the omission to require it to be remedied did not invalidate the 
notice.50 
 
                                                 
46  Batson v de Carvalho (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 417 at 425. 
47  [2006] 1 WLR 201 at [64]-[65]. 
48  [2006] 1 WLR 201. 
49  [1935] 1 KB 87. 
50  Ibid at 90-91 per Greer LJ. 
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The logic behind this decision was that if a person permitted property to be used for 
an illegal or immoral purpose, merely stopping this use would not remedy the 
breach, as knowledge of the breach in the vicinity would seriously affect the value of 
the reversion. Even a money payment together with the cessation of the illegal use 
of the property, the Court said, would not be a sufficient remedy. There was also 
support for the view that a breach could not be remedied if it was not capable of 
being remedied “within a reasonable time”, following the exact words of the 
legislation. Thus, if the breach was of such a character that many months or years 
might elapse before the breach could be remedied to the satisfaction of the lessor, 
the lease would not for the purposes of the section be capable of remedy within a 
reasonable time and thus, effectively not capable of remedy at all.51 Thus, the notice 
was held to be good without the requiring the lessee to remedy the breach or make 
compensation in money. 
 This decision was followed in Egerton v Esplanade Hotels London Ltd52 where the 
breach of covenant alleged was a breach of a covenant not to do anything on the 
premises which may annoy, damage or disturb other lessees and use the premises 
for a private dwelling house only. There was a further clause which stated that the 
premises should be kept so as not to contravene any law and in a quiet, orderly and 
proper manner. 
 
The alleged breach of the lease was that the lessees used the premises between 
certain dates as a brothel in breach of the lease. The notice served upon the lessee 
did not contain any requirement that the breach should be remedied. It was 
submitted, on behalf of the lessees, that the notice was not valid as the breach was 
one capable of remedy. The alleged breach occurred in March 1945. The notice was 
served in August 1945 and the question for Morris J was whether or not the notice 
was valid. This, in turn, depended upon the question of whether the breach was 
capable of remedy within a reasonable time after August 1945. Morris J held, 
following the Court of Appeal in Rugby School (Governors) v Tannahill53 that the 
breach was not capable of remedy within a reasonable time as merely adjusting from 
the wrongful use or not continuing to commit further breaches was not, in his 
judgment, sufficient to  remedy the breach.54  
 
                                                 
51  Ibid at 93 – 94 per Maugham LJ. 
52  [1947] 2 All ER 88. 
53  [1935] 1 KB 87. 
54  Ibid at 91-92. 
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The notice given was held valid and ejectment proceedings could proceed. Morris J 
also refused relief against forfeiture on the basis it seemed impossible to him that the 
lessee responsible for managing the premises would not have known they were 
being conducted as a brothel. A similar conclusion was reached in another English 
case, Hoffman v Fineberg,55 where a covenant in the lease bade the lessee not to 
carry on upon the premises any offensive trade or business, not to cause a nuisance 
or permit the premises to be used otherwise in a manner complying with the law. The 
lessor alleged, after a police raid, that there was evidence that the premises were 
being used for the purpose of illegal gaming which was a breach of the lease. Again, 
a notice was served by the lessor that did not require the lessee to remedy the 
breach nor demand any compensation in money. The lessee claimed the notice was 
invalid because it did not require the lessee to remedy the breach. By way of 
defence, the lessee alleged the breach was capable of remedy.  
Harman J found that stopping the activity would not remedy the breach as the lessor 
was entitled to be protected against the slur that was involved in being  the lessor of 
an illegal gaming house, even though no monetary damage ensued from that 
circumstance.  The lessee, who was convicted for illegal gaming, was compliant with 
the law at the time of the application. Notwithstanding this, Harman J held that the 
lessee could not make the record clean merely by compliance.56 However, His 
Lordship was not prepared to go so far as to say that all breaches involving a 
criminal offence would be breaches incapable of remedy.57 He also refused to grant 
relief against forfeiture. 
 
Neuberger LJ, in Akici v Butlin Ltd,58 questioned whether the conclusion clearly to be 
drawn from these decisions on unlawful use, was that a breach of covenant which 
fixed the premises with some sought of “irremovable stigma” will result in the breach 
being incapable of remedy.59 Although not reaching any firm conclusion his Lordship 
did say that, in terms of policy, there is force in the view that a lessee who has used 
premises for illegal or moral purposes should not be able to avoid the risk of 
forfeiture simply by ceasing that use on being given notice of it.60 
 
                                                 
55  [1949] Ch 245. 
56  Ibid 257. 
57  Ibid at 256. 
58  [2006] 1 WLR 201. 
59  Ibid at [68]. 
60  Ibid . 
  15 
It is submitted, that, consistent with the views in the Australian courts set out above, 
that a breach of a use covenant involving illegal or immoral use should be capable of 
remedy in most, if not all cases, upon ceasing that use after the notice was served.. 
It would mean that a notice to remedy the breach, in such a case, should state that 
the breach might be remedied by ceasing that particular unlawful use.  If action had 
been taken by the lessor to forfeit the lease based upon this ground, then there is no 
reason why, in our view, the lessee should not be able to apply for relief against 
forfeiture in the usual way. 
 
The notice might also demand some form of compensation if the lessor had suffered 
loss. However, it is hard to see what loss might be suffered, as it presumably could 
only relate to a diminution in value of the premises as a result of the breach.  This 
consequence seems unlikely in Australia today given the ways in which unlawful, 
and even immoral use, may be viewed compared to the time when these cases were 
heard, and, secondly, given the intrinsic value of commercial land in Australia, 
however previously used. It is conceded that this analysis does not meet the 
situation where there have been a series of these types of breach, all remedied in 
accordance with the notice, but still persisting intermittently. One answer to this 
contention might be that the catalogue of breaches may be so wilful and deliberate 
so as to show a determination in the lessee not to be bound by the terms of the 
lease, thereby amounting to a renunciation by the lessee. In such a case, it may not 
be necessary for the lessor to proceed by way of service of a notice in the first 
instance but merely affect a common law re-entry after acceptance of the lessee’s 
conduct as a repudiation of the lease.61 
 
Conclusion 
 
The question of validity of a notice to remedy a breach of covenant is not a matter of 
idle academic speculation but goes to the very heart of whether a lessor can 
exercise rights to terminate a lease. It is clear that Neuberger and Mummery LJJ in 
Akici v LR Butlin Ltd62 have found themselves severely constrained by authority 
when assessing the validity of a notice which did not require a lessee to remedy a 
breach. Neuberger LJ clearly would put practicality ahead of technicality which is in 
                                                 
61  See ,as a recent  example, Apriaden Pty Ltd v Seacrest Pty Ltd (2005) V Conv.R 54-704 
(CA);Marshall v Snowy River  Shire Council (1994) 7 BPR 14,447. 
62  [2006] 1 WLR 201. 
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keeping with the judgment of Sugerman J in Batson v de Carvalho63 given in 1948. It 
is interesting, but not surprising, that this latter judgment was not cited to the English 
Court of Appeal.  Regardless of this, it clearly shows Sugerman J to be a judge well 
ahead of his time. Therefore, as a matter of sound common sense, most breaches, 
in the first instance, should be considered capable of remedy. Those few which are 
not, for example, a conviction of an offence, if relied upon to found a breach of 
covenant permitting forfeiture, may be presumed to be not capable of remedy. 
However, the notice should be given to alert the lessee of the entitlement to apply for 
a relief against forfeiture in keeping with both the letter and spirit of the legislation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63  (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 417. 
